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This essay examines the foreign policy discourse in contemporary Ger-
many. In reviewing a growing body of  publications by German academics 
and foreign policy analysts, it identifies five schools of thought based on 
different worldviews,  assumptions about international politics,  and pol-
icy recommendations. These schools of  thought are then related to, first, 
actual preferences held by  German policymakers and the public more 
generally and, second,  to a  small set of grand strategies that Germany 
could pursue in the future. It argues that the spectrum of likely choices is 
narrow, with the two  most probable-the strategies of "Wider West" and 
"Carolingian  Europe"---continuing the  multilateral  and  integrationist 
orientation of the old Federal Republic. These findings are contrasted 
with  diverging assessments  in the non-German professional literature. 
Finally, the essay sketches avenues for future research by suggesting ways 
for broadening the study of country-specific grand strategies, developing 
and testing inclusive  typologies of more abstract foreign policy strate-
gies,  and refining the analytical tools in examining foreign policy  dis-
courses in general. 
It is  in our interest to preserve peace whereas, without exception, our continental 
neighbors harbor desires,  secret or officially known, which can only be realized 
through war. We  must formulate our policy accordingly; that is  to say,  we have to 
prevent or contain war, we must avoid our hand being forced in the European game 
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of  cards, and we must not allow ourselves to be pushed by either impatience, favors 
at the expense of the country, vanity, or friendly provocation from a wait-and-see 
attitude to one of  action too early  .... [W]e should strive to reduce the irritations 
which have been aroused by our becoming a real great power by making honest and 
peace-loving use of our influence in order to convince the world that a German 
hegemony in Europe is  more helpful, impartial, and innocuous to the freedom of 
others than either a French, Russian, or British one (Bismarck, 1929 [1898]:543). 
The radical changes brought about by the end of the Cold War and the breakup 
of the Soviet Union have significantly recast the foreign policy issues and chal-
lenges facing countries in Europe. Such is especially the case for Germany both 
because the two German states of the Cold War period, the Federal Republic of 
Germany (FRG)  and the German Democratic Republic  (GDR),  have been re-
united and because unification has been accompanied by  the removal of the 
restrictions  placed  on  the  sovereignty  of these  states  by  the victorious  Four 
Powers after World War II. 
In Germany, as  in other countries, changed conditions have stimulated a lively 
debate over future policy directions within the foreign policy analysis community. 
The debate within  Germany  has  special  significance because of Germany's  role 
within Europe, within the Western Alliance, and within the global economy. As  a 
result, the future of German foreign policy has become a subject for discussion and 
speculation among North American (for example, Hoffinann, 1990; Mearsheimer, 
1990; Hopmann, 1994) as well as European (Sana, 1990; Verheyen and Soe, 1993; 
Garton Ash, 1994) scholars. Yet,  there are sharp contrasts between the assumptions 
that non-Germans and Germans have made regarding feasible alternatives. 
The ability of non-German speakers to access the German discourse on future 
foreign  policy  alternatives has been limited because this  debate has been con-
ducted largely in German.2  Consequently, it has received little attention outside 
Germany. Nevertheless, the importance of this discourse for understanding which 
foreign policy scenarios are more or less likely is suggested by  Ole W;ever (1994). 
He argues that the foreign policy discourse of a country sets the parameters for 
foreign policy choices, at least in the near term. Competing discourses within a 
country provide insights into "those structures in  the societies that play a major 
role in shaping foreign policy" (p. 254; emphasis in the original). For W;ever there 
are two major advantages to what he calls foreign policy "discourse analysis." One 
is that: 
It  stays totally clear of  any relationship to what people really think. It  is not  interested 
in inner motives, in interests or beliefs; it studies something public,  that is  how 
meaning is generated and structured in a national context. If it is true that this has 
both a certain inertia and a relatively strong structuring effect on foreign policy, one 
has found  a  location for  studying a  domestic factor which  is  at the same time 
important and accessible (p. 254). 
Another advantage  is  that discourse analysis  is  "able to explain  even  grand 
designs ...  which is  often problematic in a  [foreign policy analysis] tradition 
which focuses on decisions seen as reactions to specific stimuli" (p. 255). To be 
sure,  discourse "is  by  definition never settled"  and for  this reason discourse 
analysis cannot predict change in a  country's foreign policy.  It can, however, 
"sense when a  change is approaching and it can tell what are the most easily 
available options, and what are the almost completely excluded lines of action" 
(p.255). 
2For an exception, see the collection of essays by Gennan foreign policy experts edited by Arnulf Baring (1994) 
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This review essay examines the foreign policy discourse in contemporary Ger-
many. First, it distinguishes and describes the worldviews, assumptions, and policy 
recommendations of  five different schools of  thought represented by scholars and 
analysts in Germany. Second, it examines how these schools of thought relate to 
actual preferences held by policy  makers in the government and in the political 
parties, as well as by the public more generally. Third, it analyzes the positions of 
these schools as they relate to a small set of grand strategies that Germany could 
pursue in the future and argues that the spectrum of likely choices is narrow, with 
the two most probable ("Wider West"  and "Carolingian Europe") continuing the 
multilateral and integrationist orientation of the old FRG. Such a  development 
would  be  particularly  at odds with  expectations based on neorealism  (Mears-
heimer, 1990; Waltz,  1993, 1994). Finally, the essay sketches possible avenues for 
future research. 
The Foreign Policy Discourse in Germany 
In a  recent article on the foreign policy of contemporary Germany, an astute 
British  observer of German  history  and politics  noted  that the  old  Federal 
Republic 
has over the last 30 years pursued one of  the most consistent foreign policies of  any 
Western  power.  As  a  result,  it has a  well-formed  foreign  policy  tradition. This 
tradition, a blend of  Adenauerian Westpolitik and Brandtian Ostpolitik, has several 
distinctive features. Besides the renunciation of force and the pursuit of  reconcili-
ation with  former foes,  there is  what one might call  attritional multilateralism. 
German diplomacy has excelled at the patient, discreet pursuit of national goals 
through multilateral institutions and negotiations, whether in the European Com-
munity, NATO, or the Helsinki process (Garton Ash,  1994:71). 
Especially in the eyes of non-German observers, another distinguishing feature 
of this foreign policy tradition is a reluctance on the part of all postwar German 
governments to define clearly what Germany's national interests are.  Indeed, 
even German observers point out that the FRG "has never conducted a sover-
eign foreign policy,  never a  truly national, never even a  largely autonomous 
foreign policy"  (Ruhl,  1992:741). Germans mostly see this "multilateralization 
of German foreign  policy  as  a  matter of principle"  (Ruhl,  1992:741),  as  an 
"enlightened" choice (Muller, 1992: 163). In the eyes of non-Germans, however, 
this view represents only one side of the coin. The other side is  that German 
foreign policy always tends to be "sowohl-als-auch-politik," that is, Germany is 
trying to "have it all ways"  by  seeking cover in multilateral or supranational 
environments, "using the diversity of its interests to avoid hard choices"  (The 
Economist, 1993:23; also Garton Ash, 1994:78). 
Given Germany's history and the delicate positioning of the "semi-sovereign" 
Federal Republic (Katzenstein, 1987) at the center of a divided Europe, it is  not 
surprising that all the efforts of the old FRG were "devoted to avoiding interna-
tional loneliness"  (Bertram,  1994:91). As  a  result,  "sowohl-als-auch-politik" was 
seen, at least until 1990, as both sensible and unavoidable (Nerlich,  1992b:788). 
Whether or not circumstances have changed so  dramatically as  to render this 
policy  obsolete  is  a  matter of debate.  Some argue  that it is  obsolete because 
former dependencies have been reduced while external demands have increased 
and internal resources  have shrunk (Garton Ash,  1994:73; Schwarz,  1994b:92-
94). Others Uoffe, 1995:44) point out that the complications of Germany's "ultra-
permissive" geopolitical environment have increased rather than decreased .... , 
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planet after the end of the Cold War"  (Risse-Kappen, 1995: 19); as  the now often 
quoted phrase goes, Germany today finds itself for the first time in the enviable 
position of  being encircled by friends. Yet, Joffe (1994:38) argues that such "safety 
does not make for an easy grand strategy, nor for a  clear thrust or deternlinate 
purpose,"  especially  since  "as  usual,  Germany  has  to juggle more balls  than 
nlOSt." 
Whatever the pros and cons, or the prospects, of continuing a policy aimed at 
keeping Germany's options open, there is no doubt that the terms of reference in 
the foreign policy discourse within Germany are markedly different today than 
they were prior to 1990. Not only is  there an increasing interest in (and a growing 
debate about) the usefulness of different concepts of "national interests" (Sturmer, 
1994; Wolf,  1995b), but attention is  also focused on what German interests and 
role in international affairs ought to be. 
Two particular issues have figured prominently in the public debate during the 
past few  years. The first, which has been on German policymakers' agenda ever 
since the 1990-1991 Gulf  War and which still catches headlines, is  the question of 
whether and under what conditions Germany should contribute forces to multilat-
eral  peacekeeping  or peace-enforcing operations  (Bastian,  1993;  S.  Brunner, 
1993; Schmillen,  1993a; Nerlich,  1994; Inacker,  1995; StUrmer,  1995). The sec-
ond, more fundamental, issue is  the debate over the basic Western orientation 
("Westbindung") of Germany. In contrast to the first issue, which involves public 
opinion more broadly,  this  latter issue  is  much  more an  elite-based  discourse 
between, on the one hand, a  small but outspoken group of mostly  youn~ and 
rightist intellectuals with some access to national-conservative media outlets  and, 
on the other hand, a very diverse group of intellectuals, academics, and policy-
makers ranging from center-conservative to the left. 
Although  these debates  capture  two  crucial  and  difficult  issues  confronting 
postunification German foreign  policy,  their highly politicized nature tends  to 
obscure both the magnitude and the diversity of the problems and choices con-
fronting Germany. Therefore, rather than focus on issues that dominate the head-
lines, this review essay analyzes five different schools of thought that dominate the 
serious but less-publicized  debate over Germany's future  foreign  policy.  These 
schools can be classified as  the pragmatic multilateralists, the europeanists, the 
euroskeptics,  the  internationalists,  and  the  normalization-nationalists.  These 
schools  differ  in  their  policy  recommendations  as  well  as  in  their underlying 
assumptions and worldviews. 
Before proceeding, however, several qualifications are in order. First, this review 
essay concentrates on current discussions of German foreign policy, ignoring the 
debate that emerged in the immediate aftermath of unification. (For good over-
views  of this  earlier period, see  ~1iiller,  1992; Anderson and Goodman,  1993; 
Gutjahr,  1994.) Second, the analysis of the different schools of thought excludes 
the statements of senior politicians and decision makers, although the political 
influence of the five  schools is  indicated. The review focuses,  instead, on those 
who are widely  considered  to be the most original,  influential,  and  articulate 
foreign  policy  analysts in the German media, universities,  and think tanks.  Of 
course, this is  not to say  that politicians and foreign policymakers are unimpor-
tant. Obviously quite the opposite is  the case. However, there are good reasons to 
3The two  most prominent publications of this "new democratic right."  as they call themselves,  are  Zitelmann, 
WeiBmann. and Grossheim  (1993) and Schwilk and &hacht (1995); in fairness, it is  important to add that not all 
contributors to these two volumes subscribe to the political agenda of the "new democratic right." For a critique, see 
Herzinger and Stein (1995); see also the articles that appeared in the series "What's Right" in the Frankfurter "4llgemnne 
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assume  that analysts  and experts outside the centers of power will  be freer  to 
speak their minds. Moreover, since they often show up in advisory functions, it is 
plausible to assume that much of their thinking will  eventually be reflected in 
either government or opposition policy. Finally, every attempt has been made not 
to distort the views of individual authors by subsuming them under a  particular 
school.  Nonetheless, it is  acknowledged that ideal-type "schools" may not suffi-
ciently differentiate the argumentation of authors within a given school. 
Pragmatic M ultilateralists 
One rather  distinct  school  of thought about German  foreign  policy  can  be 
labeled the "pragmatic multilateralists." This school is largely made up of those 
foreign policy experts who represented the centrist foreign policy views of the 
old FRG. Many of these individuals-senior experts in German foreign policy 
think  tanks  as  well  as  some  academics-were  (and  are)  quite  influential  in 
foreign policy decision-making circles.  In  the view of this group,  the starting 
point for any serious analysis of German interests is  the country's embedment 
in and interconnectedness with the wider world 
If it is  to  serve  German  interests,  Germany's  new foreign  policy  can  only  be 
conducted against the reality of the diverse regional and global interdependencies 
which connect the German society, economy, and polity with the external world and 
which create ties rendering partnership with others a  precondition of successful 
German foreign policy (Kaiser and Maull, 1994:xviii). 
It is  certainly not the emphasis on multilateralism that is peculiar to this group. 
Indeed, an overwhelming majority of German foreign policy experts from dif-
ferent  schools  of thought can  subscribe  to  this  statement.  Rather,  it  is  the 
combination of a  basic commitment to multilateralism and a  certain pragma-
tism that characterizes this school. Three characteristics of this school are espe-
cially noteworthy. 
First, according to pragmatic multilateralists, there is  no need for a wholesale 
reinvention of German foreign policy (Kaiser,  1994: 11;  StUrmer,  1994:53). As  a 
matter of fact, there is much to learn from the successes of the first forty years of 
the Federal Republic. "Einbindungspolitik"-as the old FRG's diplomatic strategy 
of multilateralism  and integration  is  commonly  known within  Germany-has 
turned out to be "a more cost-efficient variant to  a  strategy based on narrowly 
defined national interests" (Haftendorn, 1994: 140). It has also been (and still is) 
widely  regarded  as  a  morally  responsible choice  compared with  past German 
behavior and  the  repeated  destruction  that it has brought on the peoples  of 
Europe (Kiinhardt, 1994). 
According to pragmatic multilateralists, the changes in Germany's environment 
after 1990, if anything, have reinforced the incentives to stick with this multilat-
eral orientation. "The combination of increasing tendencies for destabilization in 
world  politics  and  transnational  interconnectedness  between  regions  has  in-
creased the demand for multilateral regulation"  (Kaiser,  1994:7; see also Biihl, 
1994:175-181; Haftendorn,  1994:148;  Nerlich,  1994:158). Although pragmatic 
multilateralists recognize that Germany is  today one of the three big players in 
the world economy (Kloten,  1994), they also hasten to add that it is,  by far,  the 
one that is  most dependent on an open world economy,  especially within the 
European Union, the North Atlantic area, and the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) (Walter, 1995:54-57). Politically and mili-
tarily, Germany is not perceived to be in a position to deal on its own with any of 
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"stabilize" central and eastern Europe is  a major German foreign policy interest, 
the pragmatic multilateralists believe that it is neither wise nor materially possible 
for Germany, a  nonnuclear middle power,  to act unilaterally (Ruhl,  1992:744-
747; SchOllgen,  1993:128-132; R.  Wolf,  1993:230-235; Kaiser,  1994:5-8; StUr-
mer,  1994:55-56). The same holds for a long list of additional problems of the 
new "era of globalism," ranging from containing the spread of weapons of mass 
destruction to international terrorism and trade in narcotics (Kaiser, 1995). 
A second characteristic view of pragmatic multilateralists is  an acceptance of 
the notion that Germany's "power" and, even more important, its international 
"responsibility"  have  increased  (Sch611gen,  1993: 152-153;  Haftendorn, 
1994: 148-150; Kaiser, 1994: 10). As the subsequent discussion of the thinking of 
"internationalists"  will  show,  both  concepts  are  highly  contested.  Pragmatic 
multilateralists base this view on two assumptions: first,  that Germans have to 
come to terms with "the necessity of assuming a  greater share of new interna-
tional responsibilities," and second, that this role has to be "commensurate with 
[Germany's] political and economic weight as  well  as  the expectations of its 
allies" (Meiers, 1995:97,96). To be sure, the "expectations" of Germany's allies 
are far from uniform.  Moreover,  Germany's  "political and economic weight" 
carries no specific, universally accepted imperatives as to how it should conduct 
its  foreign and security policy.  Still,  the context within which such arguments 
are generally made leaves little doubt as  to what the proponents of taking a 
greater share of international responsibility mean. Although it is seldom explic-
itly acknowledged (for an exception, see Kaiser,  1993a), these analysts subscribe 
to at least three of the ideas undergirding Realpolitik:  (1)  that order in the 
international system-in the sense of predictable, stable, and peaceful relations 
among major powers-is valuable; (2)  that the threat and use of force is both 
necessary  and  legitimate  as  an  ultima  ratio  to  (re)establish  order  given  the 
conflict-ridden nature of international politics and the repeated occurrence of 
war;  and (3)  that the major powers have both a  special interest and a  special 
obligation to see that order is kept (or reestablished). 
For pragmatic multilateralists, it follows that contemporary Germany again has 
to be regarded as one of the major powers in the world and that it also has to 
participate in the task of providing for international order. Hence, if it is  "nor-
mal" for a great power to be "responsible" for creating and keeping international 
order-even if  only in a "co-leadership" role (Haftendorn, 1994: 150)-and if this 
may, at times, necessitate the use of force, then it is also part of the "normaliza-
tion" of German foreign policy to shed whatever restrictions exist to participating 
fully  in  these  activities  (see,  for  example,  Sch611gen,  1993:137-143;  Kaiser, 
1994:9--10; Nerlich, 1994:157-163; StUrmer, 1994:44-51). Having said this, prag-
matic multilateralists  hasten to add four qualifications.  First,  force  may be the 
ultima ratio, but "soft power" instruments are more important in managing the 
increasing international interdependence because "'welfare' rather than 'warfare'" 
a  offe,  1995:44)  defines  the new paradigm of international relations.  (See also 
Kaiser,  1995:33-34.) Second,  as  a  general rule, Germany cannot be successful 
unless it acts in conjunction with other Western powers-"for Germany, the ability 
to act ("Handlungsfahigkeit") is, first and foremost, synonymous with its ability to 
be  a  reliable Western  ally  ("westliche  Biindnisfahigkeit")"  (StUrmer,  1994:61). 
Third, it is in Germany's interest to have its foreign policy activities legitimized by 
appropriate international institutions-preferably collective  security institutions 
such as the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) but, if  necessary, also by collective defense institutions made up of 
the Western democracies,  that is,  the European Union and NATO.  Fourth, al-
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multilateral actions, it "can only say no in a specific case, if it has said yes before 
in principle" (Kaiser,  1994:13).  Here the challenge for Germany is  "how to be 
both confident in itself and considerate of  others" (Bertram, 1994:92). 
Although pragmatic multilateralists  advocate a  strategy of multilateralism in 
principle,  their third distinguishing characteristic is an emphasis on the need for 
German  foreign  policymakers  to pay  more attention to defining what German 
interests are. Simply "seeking cover behind its foreign partners," as the old FRG is 
said to have done (Kaiser, 1994:8), will no longer suffice.  Pragmatic multilateral-
ists,  however,  differ among  themselves  about the nature of German interests. 
Some (StUrmer, 1994:59; Kaiser,  1995:35-36) argue that although it may, at first, 
appear contradictory "to pursue genuine German interests at the same time as 
one is  demonstrating solidarity with  the allies,"  this contradiction is  easily  re-
solved by pointing out that, "as before, all of the essential German interests can 
only be realized if, and insofar as, they correspond to the essential interests of its 
allies." 
Other pragmatic multilateralists (N  erlich, 1992a:518-522) see more of a struc-
tural tension between Germany's continuing interest in operating within multilat-
eral contexts and the interests of some of its major Western allies,  particularly 
those of France and Britain. The latter are viewed as primarily interested in those 
institutional functions  of NATO and the European  Union that help constrain 
Germany (for example, stationing allied forces on German soil, constituting mul-
tinational corps primarily of German forces,  and having a  European Monetary 
Union) without  requiring  themselves  to  reciprocate  (for  example,  by  pushing 
ahead with European political integration or by creating supranational military 
structures at the European level). Yet,  if institutions such as the European Union 
and NATO continue to be regarded as  instruments "to control the Germans," 
they will not only fail to build the kinds of  flexible structures needed to respond to 
the new security challenges within and around Europe, they may also provoke a 
backlash within Germany. Consequently, Nerlich (1992a:522) argues that: 
Mere continuity with the multilateral diplomacy of the [old] Federal Republic will 
increasingly lead to complications. Given that Germany will remain at the center of 
European security policy for the foreseeable future-due not so much to its history 
as  to its geostrategic location in the middle of Europe and its superior role as an 
economic power ...  , it will have to structure the framework [of European security] 
in ways that are not just simply constraining for the purpose of  perpetual reassur-
ance. 
Because  future  conflicts  will  require highly  flexible  mechanisms  for  conflict 
prevention and management, probably involving ad hoc multilateralism and 
"hybrid coalitions," such restructuring is important, if not necessary. 
Pragmatic  multilateralists  also  disagree  among themselves  on what  specific 
substantive interests Germany has. For instance, although most pragmatic multi-
lateralists believe that Germany's major interests lie within the bounds of the 
European continent, some argue that "German foreign policy towards Europe is 
not possible  by  concentrating on  Europe"  and  that  the German government 
ought to broaden its  foreign  policy  (von  Bredow,  1993: 175;  von  Bredow and 
Jager, 1993:69,225; Kaiser,  1995:34-36). Moreover, although some see a perma-
nent seat for Germany in the UN Security Council as an "inevitable consequence" 
of Germany's increased international power (Kaiser,  1994:8, also  1993a), others 
argue that both Germany's interests and those of the broader international com-
munity may be better served if this does not happen (Riihl,  1992:754; Wagner, 
1993).  Such differences on particular issues  notwithstanding, all  these authors 
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ought to stick with its multilateral orientation as a matter of  principle; (2) that this 
policy will entail taking over more responsibilities for the maintenance of  intern  a-
tional order commensurate with Germany's increased status; (3)  that there be an 
emphasis on the growing importance of "interdependence" (Kaiser,  1995:28-29) 
and  a  rejection  of both  the  "geopoliticization"  of international  relations  and 
European politics  (von Bredow,  1993: 175)  and "geopolitical determinism" with 
regard to the formulation of German foreign policy  (StUrmer 1994:60); and (4) 
that, even though the fluidity in international politics may require "a heavy dose 
of pragmatism" and flexibility in responding to new challenges (Kaiser, 1993b:77; 
also Ruhl, 1992:752-753,759), there must be no doubt that Germany's future lies 
"in the West, and there alone" (StUrmer, 1994:60; see also Kaiser, 1995:32-33). 
There two are other schools of thought in German foreign policy that discourse 
share many assumptions and preferences with the pragmatic multilateralists: the 
"europeanists"  and  the  "euroskeptics."  In  each  school,  a  majority  of analysts 
subscribe  to the view  that Germany,  as  a  matter of principle, should pursue a 
multilateral diplomatic strategy. In this sense europeanists as well as euroskeptics 
represent variations of pragmatic multilateralism.  However,  both these schools 
differ from the latter in one important respect, which justifies describing them as 
separate schools of thought: both have strong views on Germany's policy toward 
European  integration in  general  and  the  European  Union  in  particular.  The 
europeanists advocate that the future development of the European Union (its 
deepening and widening) should be the key  concern in German foreign policy. 
The euroskeptics reject this as  "europhoria"  (Schauer,  1993) while calling upon 
German foreign policymakers to accept Germany as  a  "normal nation-state" in 
Europe  and  to  stop  aiming at a  federal  Europe.  Whereas  europeanists  and 
euroskeptics tend to perceive an acceleration of European integration as  either 
very beneficial or highly detrimental to German interests, pragmatic multilateral-
ists  refuse  to  advocate a  strong position either way  on this  issue.  Although,  in 
general, pragmatic multilateralists accept that the stakes for Germany are high 
with regard to the future of the European Union, they view it as only one institu-
tion among many. This position should not be surprising given that many prag-
matic  multilateralists  are  security  specialists  by  training,  and  highly 
"Americanized" ones at that.4 
For europeanists, the European Union is much more than just another inter-
national institution to which Germany belongs. As  a  matter of fact,  there are 
few  European or international problems and tasks, if any,  by which Germany 
can still be regarded in isolation from the European Union. "Modern leader-
ship is  realized neither by  great power politics nor by  going it alone; modern 
leadership shows itself in the initiative for community-building. So 'integration' 
becomes the key word for the new epoch in Germany and Europe" (Weidenfeld, 
1995b:2). 
According to europeanists,  there are  two  arguments why  the acceleration of 
European integration should be at the center of German foreign policy concerns. 
It  is important (1) for "internal" reasons-to prevent the reemergence of  counter-
balancing coalitions vis-a-vis Germany, and (2)  for "external" reasons-to render 
the  European  Union  a  more  competitive  actor  in  international  affairs  more 
broadly. The first argument is, most fimdamentally, based on the conviction that 
German foreign policymakers have a constitutional obligation to foster European 
integration. According to the preamble of the German constitution, Germany is 
4See Lindemann, 1995, the title of  which translates as "America within ourselves." The list of  authors in this edited 
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committed "to serve peace in the world as a member with equal rights in a united 
Europe."  More important politically,  the argument is  based on the assumption 
that recent developments in central and eastern Europe place a special burden on 
Germany  as  the  economically  most powerful  and  geopolitically  most exposed 
state in the center of Europe.  However,  if Germany were  to respond to these 
challenges by  unilaterally  expanding its  influence  (by  engaging in what Link, 
1993a: 17,  calls  the "Germanization"  of central Europe),  such an action would 
provoke balancing behavior on the part of its  western  European  allies  (Link, 
1992:605-606; Schmidt,  1995:6-7). Based on these normative and geopolitical 
concerns, a unilateralist foreign policy is considered not only unjustifiable consti-
tutionally but also counterproductive politically.  In contrast, the acceleration of 
European integration is viewed as the only sensible choice. 
The active participation of Germany in the development of federal structures in 
Europe is in its very own interest; indeed. European federalism can be regarded as 
the foreign  policy  "raison d·etat""  of Germany because in  deepening European 
integration and in creating a  European Union Germany can make best use of its 
power and increase its securily without appearing threatening and without provok-
ing counter-balancing coalitions. As a result:.  the foreign policy imperative is  to do 
everything possible  to  foster  the development of federal structures [in  Europe] 
(Link. 1992:610). 
Europeanists do not believe that accomplishing this goal will be an easy task. As 
a  matter of fact,  they doubt whether a  federal  Europe stands  any chance of 
being realized in the  foreseeable  future.  Still,  they  consider it an important 
long-term objective (Brenke,  1993:121; see also Hacker,  1995:288-289). Even 
seasoned elder statesmen, such as Helmut Schmidt (1995: 11), view it as achiev-
able eventually.  In the short and medium  term,  europeanists  think that the 
most  practical ways  to  proceed  are  to  acknowledge  explicitly  the  notion  of 
"variable speeds" in achieving objectives and to create a  "hard core" of Euro-
pean Union member states that are willing and able to move ahead faster than 
the rest (Link,  1993a:18-20; Wessels,  1993:313-315; Janning,  1994; Weiden-
feld,  1995a: 12). In any of these scenarios, Franco-German cooperation is essen-
tial  (Link,  1993a: 18-20; Schmidt,  1995  :8), while German-American relations, 
although important, rank second (Link, 1993b:51-55). 
Europeanists also support an acceleration of European integration to improve 
Europe's role in competing with other centers of power in North America and 
Asia. None of the key members of the European Union, including contemporary 
Germany,  is  viewed  as  able  to compete effectively  on its  own with  the United 
States, Japan, or China in any of the major issue areas (Schmidt, 1995: 11). More-
over,  both Germany  and  its  western  European  allies  are  seen  as  lagging far 
behind the other centers of economic power in all of the key  "information age" 
industries  (Seitz,  1994:828-839).  From  this  assessment,  europeanists  conclude 
that Germany's position as a leading economic power can only be preserved (or 
regained) in concert with its most important European allies and with the help of 
an institutional apparatus such as  the European Commission. Thus, because the 
(necessary) enlargement of the EU will take time and there is no time to waste, "it 
is paramount to create the hard core immediately: the Carolingian Europe of the 
six founding members" of the European Economic Community (Seitz, 1994:847). 
Proponents of this hard core strategy anticipate (and fear)  the emergence of a 
"J apanese-American high-technology duopole"  as  a  medium-term consequence 
of spreading  mergers  between  United  States  and Japanese  companies  (Seitz, 
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Euroslwptics 
Euroskeptics differ from europeanists mainly in their assessment of the future 
role of the nation-state and the possible function of the European Union. In 
general, they do not deny that the European Union and its predecessors have 
served (and continue to serve) important functions. They reject, however,  the 
notion that it is  desirable to aim at a  federally  structured Europe that tran-
scends the nation-state. 
The euroskeptics have three distinguishing characteristics. First, the end of the 
bipolar order in Europe is  synonymous with the return of the "utterly normal 
anarchy"  of the "world of states"  ("Staatenwelt") with  all  its  consequences:  the 
revival of nation-states, the reemergence of "great powers," and the reconfigura-
tion of  diverse "concerts" among these powers (Schwarz, 1994b; von Alten, 1994). 
This dramatic upheaval in the international environment has not left Germany, at 
the center of the storm, unchanged. Heavily influenced by what they perceive as 
enlightened realist thinking, euroskeptics argue that Germans still refuse to ac-
cept the new  realities and that they  continue to "fear nothing more than not 
being bound or integrated" (Koch,  1994:813). In spite of all the historicallega-
cies, for euroskeptics there is, in principle, no reason why Germany should not be 
able to meet the requirements of a "normal state." In short, Germany has to "take 
its  place"  ("sich einordnen") in the world. It should "not make itself greater or 
smaller than it actually is"; it should "accept the world of states, because there is 
no other"; and it should "move within [that world] in a rational manner as  the 
respective situation ("Lageerkenntnis") requires"  (von Alten,  1994:345; see also 
Schwarz, 1994b:95-100). 
As part of this "normality," Germany should also accept that, with unification, it 
has left behind the two "rational states"  (the Federal Republic of Germany and 
the German  Democratic  Republic)  and again become a  normal  "nation-state" 
(Hacke,  1993:537;  see  also  Schwarz,  1994b:58-68;  Baring,  1995:16).  The 
euroskeptics neither expect nor support a return to the roots of German national 
identity prior to 1945. National sentiments ("das Nationale") in the sense of the 
nineteenth century's national movements,  Hans-Peter Schwarz  (1 994b)  argues, 
have evaporated not only, but particularly, in Germany. To be sure, these senti-
ments  "somehow persist-as communities  of culture  or  history"  (Schwarz, 
1994b:87).  But it is  the state,  not the nation, that remains  tangible (Schwarz, 
1  994b:87; see also von Alten,  1994:70-77). Moreover, the main characteristic of 
the modem state is no longer the projection of power domestically and interna-
tionally; it is,  instead, the democratic welfare state that stands out as  its central 
feature. "The national egotism of the democratic welfare state-this is what is left 
of the old state, and it will continue to play a role in all of the mature western 
democracies" (Schwarz 1994b:87). 
Yet,  for euroskeptics, Germany is not only a normal nation-state, it is  a "great 
power" (Hacke, 1993:521-522; von Alten, 1994:106--121,329-330) and the "cen-
tral  power"  of Europe (Schwarz,  1994b:70-79). According to euroskeptics,  this 
great power status carries special rights and responsibilities-and it is  the latter 
that are often perceived as "burdens" (von Alten, 1994: 114-119). This perception 
is  particularly acute because of the many dilemmas (or "multilemmas") that Ger-
many faces  as  a  result of reunification (Schwarz,  1994a). Germany needs to go 
through  a  difficult  "maturation"  process  before it resumes  its  "proper"  place 
among the great powers. This process is  seen to be difficult,  first,  because the 
Germans (for understandable historical reasons reaching back to the first German 
unification in the  1870s)  still  lack  a  "political  class"  that is  able "to lead and 
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337). Moreover, this task is  further complicated by the fact that Germany's great 
power status has two contradictory components: 
First, there is indeed a great  distance [in terms of  standard power indicators  1  between 
Germany and the powers next in rank,  i.e.,  France,  Britain, and Italy;  second, 
Germany is located in an environment of  equally efficient and productive neighbors 
that  would not allow it to dominate economically, even if  it  wan ted to ....  [Moreover, 
all these states  1  are highly interdependent economically. The resulting consequence 
is  as simple to recognize as  it is  fundamental: Germany is,  of course,  the most 
powerful, and, therefore, also potentially the most influential European country; at 
the same time, it can only prosper as long as it takes  its  place in this  system of 
interdependence as a partner. Attempts at unilateral domination or the formatioll 
ofa block of  states with Germany at its center would provoke counter-coalitions and 
would destroy the system ofinterdependence (Schwarz,  1994b:78). 
This assessment-that "the world of states" is  returning, that a  diverse set of 
"great powers"  has replaced  the predominance of the Soviet-American rivalry, 
and that a  delicately positioned and ill-prepared Germany will  have to take its 
place among these powers-leads to the second major characteristic of euroskep-
tics:  an  emphasis  on  traditional  instruments  of great power politics  (such  as 
alliances, diplomacy, great power concerts) in contrast to the formal institutionali-
zation  of international  cooperation  in  supranational structures  (von  Alten, 
1994:322-323). In the realist tradition, euroskeptics have long castigated as "po-
litically dangerous" what they perceive to be a  tendency on the part of German 
decision  makers  "to conduct foreign  policy  without  any  regard  to  traditional 
considerations of power politics"  (Hacke,  1993:421). This criticism has become 
more pronounced as  a  result of the perceived magnitude of the challenges in 
central and eastern Europe and the alleged inaction on the part of the German 
government.  Euroskeptics  believe  that it has  paid  too  much  attention  to  the 
(structurally different) interests of many of  its western European partners (Baring, 
1995: 17-19). Again, this is not to say that euroskeptics think that Germany should 
opt for power maximization and unilateralism. It does, however, mean that "Ger-
man foreign policy,  including Germany's European policy, will in the future for 
objective reasons become more selfish, more calculated and cost-conscious, less 
flexible  and  primarily  fixed  on a  rather narrowly  defined  national  interest" 
(Schwarz,  1994b:90-95). Moreover, given its central position, Germany's "fate" is 
to "intelligently balance a complicated system of  (interlocking) balances of power" 
made up mainly of the European Union, NATO, and a regional balance of  power 
system stretching from "the European zone of  stability to the earthquake zone in 
the Balkans and eastern Europe" (Schwarz, 1994b: 121). 
The third major view that euroskeptics hold follows logically from this analysis 
of German interests and the basic trends in international and European politics. 
In contrast to the advice of pragmatic multilateralists to act pragmatically and 
flexibly  within international institutions in an international environment that is 
both highly interdependent and still very much in flux,  euroskeptics argue that 
the shape of the new environment is  sufficiently clear (at least as far Germany is 
concerned) to formulate clear-cut priorities in German foreign policy. 
NATO stands unequivocally at the top of the euroskeptics' list of priorities. In 
spite of the internal  differences  within  the alliance  that appeared during the 
Balkan crisis, NATO is still seen as the only functioning link between Europe and 
the United States. Washington's continued military presence is deemed vital both 
for  the balancing  of intra-European  relations  and as  reassurance  against  the 
prevailing risks in eastern Europe, especially in Russia (Schwarz, 1994c:781-783). 
Moreover, given that Germany cannot count on its major European allies, France 
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and structural fact that was brought back to the Germans during the Two-plus-
Four negotiations on Germany unification), it should clearly side with the Ameri-
cans  if there  should  ever  arise  a  conflict  between  Germany's  European and 
Atlanticist  interests  (Feldmeyer,  1993:18-19).  NATO  also  should  remain  Ger-
many's first foreign policy priority for moral reasons. The alliance is the "legiti-
mate  heir  and  extension  of the  'Four  Freedoms'  of President  Roosevelt,  the 
Atlantic Charter, and the United Nations, indeed of the anti-Hitler coalition of 
the core states of  world civilization" (von Alten, 1994:344). Germany's "anchor" is 
in the West, in general, and "in the middle of the Atlantic," in particular (Hacke, 
1993:557) because being a member of the Atlantic community "may be the best 
thing that is worth preserving from the Cold War; what is  more, it may even be 
the best thing that has ever happened to Germany" (von Alten, 1994:344). 
For euroskeptics, Germany's second foreign policy priority should be the "irre-
versible political, economic, and cultural integration within the West (,"Westbin-
dung"') of Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians, Slovenians, possibly also of Croats, 
Bulgarians,  Romanians,  Estonians,  Latvians,  and  Lithuanians"  (Schwarz, 
1994c:783;  see  also  Baring,  1995:17).  Although  this  goal  also  ranks  high for 
pragmatic multilateralists and europeanists, there are several major differences 
between them and the euroskeptics. The latter put more emphasis on the struc-
turally diverging interests of Germany on the one side and Britain and, particu-
larly  France,  on  the  other  (Schwarz,  1994b:87-92,  1994c:776-778;  Baring, 
1995: 17-20). Moreover, they argue that the considerable risks associated with the 
transformation process in these central European states "make it imperative to 
stabilize the regions from Gdansk to Budapest and Bratsilawa at any cost, or at 
least at almost any cost" (Schwarz, 1  994b: 115; see also Baring, 1995: 17-20). To be 
sure, euroskeptics do not advocate German unilateralism; their primary and ulti-
mate objective is  to integrate Germany's eastern neighbors into western institu-
tions.  Euroskeptics,  however,  in  contrast  to  pragmatic  multilateralists  and 
europeanists, advocate a  more assertive approach vis-a-vis  its western European 
partners in order to  make  them  more responsive  to  Germany's own interests. 
Such an approach will require "greater toughness and vigilance in negotiations" 
(Schwarz, 1994b:93). 
As  the name of the school suggests,  the third (and defining)  foreign  policy 
priority on the euroskeptics' agenda revolves around their rejection of a  federal 
Europe.  They  are  not in  principle  against  a  further  deepening of European 
integration in specific areas where all members may profit (such as environmental 
policy  or immigration). Their clear preference, however,  is  a  widening of the 
European Union "with all its  consequences"  (Schwarz,  1994c:786). They reject 
measures to accelerate the trend toward centralization and overregulation by the 
European Union bureaucracy in Brussels.  This discussion focuses  especially on 
those  areas  of policy  that the  member states  value  highly nationally-such as 
national  autonomy  in foreign  and  security  matters  in  the  French and  British 
cases, or the independence of the Deutsche Mark in the German case. Euroskep-
tics advocate a more stringent German attitude toward the financing of the Euro-
pean Union budget, particularly as far as subsidies for southern European regions 
are concerned (Schwarz, 1994b:91-95, 1994c:785-786; Baring, 1995:21, n. 7). 
Internationalists 
Although  pragmatic  multilateralists,  europeanists,  and  euroskeptics  differ 
somewhat in their assessment of the basic trends in international affairs and the 
important issues in German foreign policy,  there are many similarities in the 
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to some extent by realist thinking, especially with regard to the possible  conse-
quences of the geopolitical changes in Europe. To be sure, this is not to say that 
the  analysts  of these  three schools  are  realists.  As  a  matter of fact,  with  the 
possible exception of the euroskeptics, the majority would probably reject such 
a label outright, identitying more easily with the label "institutionalists." How-
ever, realist thinking does inform  the analysis of all three schools, if only (as in 
the case of pragmatic multilateralists and europeanists) in suggesting the warn-
ing signs and points of reference that facilitate devising "institutionalist" solu-
tions to "realist" problems. 
A fourth school of thought, the "internationalists," differs fundamentally from 
the previously discussed schools with regard to realist thinking.  For them, such 
thinking is  wholly inadequate for addressing any major global problem (either 
analytically or prescriptively). In contrast to the debate about "national" interests 
among some of the representatives  of the first  three schools,  internationalists 
emphasize that Germany's interests are not really national in the traditional sense 
but "interconnected" ("verflochtene Interessen" according to Senghaas, 1995; see 
also Wolf,  1995a).  Some internationalists  even argue  that Germany  should be 
"aiming at  a  national  policy  in  the  international  interest"  rather  than  being 
"guided by the principle of  international politics in the national interest" and that 
"in this regard the values of peace-maintenance, safeguarding of nature, human 
rights, and the elimination of  poverty have priority" (Volmer and Fues, 1993:71). 
'Ibese  quotes  already  indicate  that  the  internationalists  approach  the chal-
lenges facing German foreign policy in a different manner than any of the three 
schools of thought discussed earlier. The central point of departure for interna-
tionalists is their judgment that today's foreign policy has to be conducted against 
the background of an ever more complex and interdependent world. Indeed, this 
world has changed so much during the past four decades that there simply is  no 
"foreign" policy anymore; there is only "internationalizing policy" ("international-
isierende Politik"-Czempiel,  1993:151) or "policy within one world"  ("Weltin-
nenpolitik"), because whatever decision makers do has consequences that are as 
much domestic as  they are international or global (Brock, forthcoming). Interna-
tionalists have some clarity about the nature of the agenda for this "one world" 
and the hierarchy of issues. Ecological threats to sustainable global development, 
which  are  in  large  part a  result of modem  industrialization,  are  the highest 
priority (Breyer,  1993). However, the preconditions for action are not well speci-
fied.  There can be no doubt that  the world  hangs  together,  but lww  it  does 
so-that is,  the worldwide consequences of discrete policy choices-is far from 
clear  because  today's  world  society  is  at risk  from  "civilizationally  produced 
threats which can neither be controlled spatially nor temporally or socially" (Beck, 
1995: 13; see also Zurn, 1995). 
Internationalists agree almost unanimously that a "world-state" is  neither likely 
nor  desirable  (Lutz,  1993a)  and  that  the  "world  of states"  is  gone for  good 
(Czempiel,  1994a; Habermas, 1991: 105-110). "To be sure, nation-states will play 
a role in the era of globalism .... But they will only be sovereign with regard to 
their competence for chaos; with regard to their competence for solutions, they 
will depend on transnational and supranational structures in the future" (Fischer, 
1994:232). Yet,  it also  seems clear that the challenges to  "governance without 
government"  are immense and  that the supply of governance in the form  of 
supranational institutions, international regimes, and multilateral policy coordi-
nation  may  not correspond  to  the  increasing  demand  (Kohler-Koch,  1991a; 
Muller, 1991). 
Such is  the environment in which Germany will have to conduct its  "foreign" 
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more or no less an inter- and transnationally cooperating democracy and market 
economy which is integrated in Europe and obliged to act 'collegially' rather than 
'directorially'"  (Rittberger, 1992:215). Thus, internationalists, in concert with rep-
resentatives  from  the other three  schools,  emphasize  that Germany  is  highly 
dependent on  being on  good  terms  with  its  neighbors  and  the world  more 
broadly.  However,  in contrast to  the other schools,  internationalists  are more 
pronounced in rejecting realist concepts of  "power" or of  a "great power," because 
these are based on a  misconceived notion of power as  control over resources 
(Rittberger,  1992:208-215). A more adequate definition of power sees it as the 
luxury of being able "to afford not to learn" (Senghaas, 1993:489). Thus defined, 
Germany is  no better off now than before 1990. In a  sense it is  even worse off 
because its environment is  more complex and, therefore, more demanding. The 
concepts of "trading state" or "civilian power" are seen as  better descriptions of 
Germany's status  (Maull,  1990,  1992; Rode,  1991; Wolf,  1991a,  1991b,  1995a, 
1995b; Rittberger,  1992; Senghaas, 1994).  Neither, however, is meant to idealize 
Germany's role in international affairs given that internationalists recognize both 
the advantages (for example, the downgrading of the military as an instrument of 
foreign policy) and the shortcomings (for example, profit orientation at the ex-
pense of the ecological system and the developing countries) of the international 
roles of  states associated with these concepts. 
In the internationalists' worldview, Germany has an obligation to take over 
its  share of "responsibility"  in international affairs. It should do so  for the 
purely selfish interests of an important trading state-a key interest of  which is 
to initiate collective action to solve problems that cannot be solved unilater-
ally-and for ethical reasons. Moreover, it may have to do so in a "leadership 
role"  ("Vorreiterrolle") (Maull,  1993 :69; Wolf,  1995a:62-63). Internationalists 
define "leadership" and "responsibility" in a very different way  than the pre-
viously discussed schools. They advocate leadership and responsibility, not in 
terms of being a global policeman or firefighter in a "territorial world" domi-
nated by great powers (Rosecrance, 1986, 1993), but rather as  a promoter of 
preventive conflict management (Maull,  1992; Wolf,  1995a). As  a  matter of 
principle, Germany should stick with the strategy of "cooperative internation-
alism" that was  so successful for  the old Federal Republic. According to this 
strategy, the pursuit of political objectives is not understood as the "powerful 
or even violent realization of one's own fixed interests, but as a communication 
process that is  fluid and focuses on a  complementarity of interests"  (Kohler-
Koch, 1991b:616). 
Although internationalists take multilateralism and integration seriously, many 
criticize the fact that the substance of multilateral action is  defmed primarily by 
Germany's major Western allies, who seem ready to use "the 'power' of  contempo-
rary Germany, including its military potential, for specific international purposes, 
while denying it a  greater say  in formulating what those purposes should be" 
(Rittberger, 1  992:208-209; see also Kreile, 1993). Therefore, rather than uncriti-
cally  accepting  the roles  attributed  to  Germany by  analysts  and  allies,  whose 
thinking is still heavily dominated by the world of  nation-states, Germany should 
self-consciously choose a strategy of self-restraint and "refuse to project power or 
apply the [traditional] instruments of power, be they military, economic, or ideo-
logical" (Statz,  1  993b: 184; also Fuchs,  1993). Instead, it should defme its role in 
line with the demands of an agenda for sustainable global development. If  adopt-
ing this strategy leads to charges that Germany is, once again, pursuing a "special 
path" ("Sonderweg"), Germans should be prepared to live with the consequences, 
because selecting this  role would be proof that they have learned from history 
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All  this is  not to say  that the use of force is  excluded under any circumstances. 
There will,  of course, still be situations in which using force may be unavoidable.5 
However,  even in these cases "the crucial question will  be, whether we succeed in 
developing  effective  and  legitimate forms  of multilateral  sanctions 
("ZwangsmaBnahmen") or whether the recourse to force follows  traditional nation-
state thinking"  (Maull,  1993:71). In essence,  then, "responsible" German foreign 
policy  has  to be a  "policy  for  peace"  ("Friedenspolitik")  that has the following 
objectives: 
the promotion and protection of the [domestic] rule oflaw ["Rechtsstaatlichkeit"] 
and, more generally, of  human rights; the creation of  networks of  cooperation, that 
reduce  the security dilemma and institutionalize expectations ["Erwartungsver-
laBlichkeit"] resulting in motives for action becoming more transparent  and predict-
able; economic compensation [''Ausgleich''] without which there is no legitimacy in 
highly politicized societies; and, finally, empathy, the emotional glue that facilitates 
a constructive culture of  conflict ["Konfliktkultur"] within and between societies and 
access to constructive forms of  conflict management. Taken together, such orienta-
tions will result in a civilizing ["Zivilisierung] of  politics (Senghaas, 1993:491). 
How do these general principles translate into concrete policy recommendations 
for Germany? Although internationalists differ from the other schools of  thought in 
their specific policy recommendations, there is consensus that Germany must follow 
a  strategy of self-restraint "combined with a  policy of active commitment within 
international contexts  to international law  because this is  the only way  to realize 
mutual control of Realpolitik  ambitions"  (Statz,  1  993b: 184;  see  also  Fischer, 
1994:222). In all international contexts, the overall objective must be a "change of 
paradigm," that is, abandoning power politics in all its forms in favor of  a persistent 
pursuit of the "demilitarization of  politics" (Statz, 1  993b: 186). 
Obviously, the focus of attention in realizing such a strategy has to be Germany's 
current set of  memberships in international institutions: "Western" institutions such 
as  the European Union and NATO, but, especially, international institutions with 
more "universal" memberships like the oseE and the United Nations. Whereas 
prior to 1990, many internationalists identified the "West" predominantly with the 
military structures (and militarized policies) of NATO and Germany's major West-
ern allies,  a  majority have now come to emphasize the importance of "Western" 
institutions in general. The latter facilitate  Germany's internal development as  a 
civic democracy and its integration within multilateral and supranational structures 
(Habermas, 1990:98-99; Krell,  1992:273-274; Knapp, 1993:91; Fischer, 1994:187-
210; Naumann, 1994). Two foreign policy objectives build from these views: the first 
concerns  the continuation and acceleration of European integration; the second 
involves the need to form a collective security system that transcends NATO. 
The European Union is viewed as the only existing institution with the poten-
tial to tame national ambitions within supranational structures (Knapp, 1993:91; 
Fischer,  1994:222-225). Once making this point, however, internationalists em-
phasize that: 
5For different views on the conditions under which force may still be necessary, see Lutz, 1993b:90-94, 125-128; 
Maull,  1992:273-274, 278;  Schmillen,  1993a:36-44,  1993b;  Statz,  1993a:97-98,  1993b:189; Thomas and Weiner, 
1993:159-164; Czempiel,  1994b:39,  1994c:802-803; and  Fischer,  1995, It is  also possible to identity a  "pacifist" 
subgroup among internationalists which distinguishes itself  from the former by rejecting the use of  force under ahnost 
any circumstances, based on the conviction that military means are wholly inadequate to solve any conflict. Rather 
than considering the use of force even in cases such as the genocides in Rwanda or the Balkans, these pacifists would 
argue that it is more important to address the sources of  these atrocities and to use nonviolent countermeasures such 
as  sanctions.  For a  sample of pacifist views,  see  Krippendorff,  1992; Bastian, 1993:94-96; Nan and Vaack,  1993; 
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It  would be nai"ve  to believe that international commiUnents as such have a "civiliz-
ing" effect on the Federal Republic [since) the European Community is the starting 
point and instrument of autonomous centers of power.  An uncritically  positive 
reference to international commitment ... ignores both the national powers that 
make use of these structures of  integration, and the integration into structures that 
reinforce a militarization of  conflicts (Statz, 1993b:  190). 
Against this backdrop, internationalists demand that Germany emphasize the 
"civil forms of international commitments" and seek to play the role of a '''be-
nevolent hegemon' in the sense of supporting the strengthening of civil, joint 
["solidarisch"], and ecologically sustainable structures" (Statz, 1993b: 192, 193). 
Thus, deepening of the European Union must include EU-wide regulations that 
allow  individual member states  to  set minimum  standards in  ecological and 
social matters at the national level (Biitikofer, 1993:185-187; Statz, 1993b:192). 
As  for central and eastern Europe, internationalists advocate an Ell strategy 
that supports the creation of civil and democratic domestic structures (Albrecht, 
1993:64-65;  Fischer,  1994:225-226; Senghaas,  1995:32, 36).  Moreover,  most 
internationalists advocate the early acceptance of the membership applications 
of Germany's eastern European neighbors, especially Poland, the Czech Repub-
lic, and Hungary. Germany is perceived as having a special responsibility vis-a-
vis these countries, and these countries are seen as the best guarantors against 
any "tendencies towards a germanization of the EU" growing out of their his-
torical  experience with  a  German  hegemon  (Albrecht,  1993:67;  Fischer, 
1994:225). 
The United Nations, OSCE, and, to a lesser extent, NATO are for international-
ists  the relevant institutions  to deal with  the problem of safeguarding peace in 
Europe  and  the world.  Whereas  many  internationalists  had  favored  Germany's 
withdrawal  from  NATO before unification,  this  call  has  now been  toned  down 
because of fears that it might lead to a renationalization of German foreign policy. 
Some prominent internationalists even explicitly welcome the German army's inte-
gration within  the "transnational command structures"  of NATO,  "as long as  a 
German army exists" (Fischer,  1994:222). For internationalists, the overall objective 
of Germany's policy vis-a-vis  NATO is  to contribute to its steady "demilitarization" 
(including the renunciation of, and opposition to, any plans for "expansion"). Even-
tually,  Germany must aim  at transcending NATO with  a  true collective  security 
system. Such a goal will necessitate strengthening the United Nations at the global 
level (Rittberger, 1992:226; Czempiel, 1994c; Senghaas, 1995:36-37) and the OSCE 
at the European level.  The latter is  viewed  as  especially important for  Germany 
because it is  the only truly all-European institution with a rudimentary set of instru-
ments for conflict prevention and mediation already in place (Schlotter, 1992:29&---
297,  1995:269-272;  Senghaas,  1993:481-485;  Czempiel,  1994b:42-43;  Fischer, 
1994:225-228). In the long term, this  objective may also involve the abolition of 
alliances  and their replacement by  a  collective security  organization such as  the 
"European Security Community," modeled to some extent on the United Nations 
but endowed with a more important "General Assembly," referred to as the "Euro-
pean Security Council" (Lutz, 1993b:91-153). 
N ormalization-Nationalists 
One of the most visible schools  of thought in the public  debate  about Ger-
many's role in the new international environment includes a  group of young 
German historians who call themselves the "new democratic right" (WeiBmann, 
1994; Zitelmann, 1995) or "normalization-nationalists."6 In contrast to the pre-
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Germany's role should be in the post-Cold War international environment and 
advocate specific foreign policy responses, this group has concentrated primar-
ily  on  domestic  issues  such  as  a  revised  "image  of (German)  history" 
("Geschichtsbild"), internal security, immigration, and the presumed "discourse 
dominance" of "the left" in German political culture. 
At the core of the agenda of normalization-nationalists is  a call for Germans to 
abandon their "self-hatred" (Rohl,  1995) and to replace it with a  "love for their 
own  land"  (Seebacher-Brandt,  1995)  which  is  thought common  among other 
nations with  as  long a  history  as  Germany's.  Contemporary Germany should, 
once again,  become a  "self-confident nation,"  grounded  in  a  "familiarity with 
itself" and appreciative of its "experience and the identity of family and nation" 
(Schwilk and Schacht, 1995: 11). As one of the heroes of the new democratic right, 
the writer Botho StrauB  (1995:24)  put it in a  startling essay  for  the German 
newsmagazine Der Spiegel: 
Being right, not as a result of  cheap conviction or general intentions but out of the 
total personality, this is to experience the superiority of  a remembrance; a remem-
brance which moves man, not so much the citizen, and leaves him isolated and 
shaken in  the midst of the modern, enlightened circumstances within which he 
conducts his ordinary life. This permeated state ("Durchdrungenheit") does not  call 
for a disgusting and ridiculous masquerade of  dog-like imitation, nor does it call for 
a slide into the second-hand-shop of the history of  mischief. It requires a different 
act of rebellion: one against the total domination of the present which weeds out 
and deprives  the  individual of any presence  of unenlightened past, of historical 
coming-in  to-being, of  mythical time [emphasis in the original). 
StrauB's essay, which was originally published in February 1993, was reprinted 
as  the lead  article in one of the key  works  by  the new  democratic  right,  the 
volume Die selbstbewuflte Nation. Its editors hailed the essay as "the most emphatic, 
profound, and momentous attempt" to pursue the "spiritual conversion" neces-
sary to move Germany toward becoming a  more self-confident nation (Schwilk 
and Schacht,  1995:12). Whatever the ultimate aims of the new democratic right, 
this volume and another one edited by Zitelmann and his colleagues (1993) have 
provoked repeated charges that the normalization-nationalists are playing down 
("verharmlosen")  the Nazi period to free  the way  for a  revival  of the dubious 
political  culture  of "the people  in  the  center"  of the  continent  (Bergfleth, 
1995: 116) distinct from the West. Normalization-nationalists, however, have vigor-
ously rejected any association with or sympathies for neo-Nazism: "The crimes of 
the nazis are so immense that they cannot be compensated for by moral shame or 
other civic  sentiments.  They  put the  German  into  shock  and  left  him  there 
trembling"  (StrauB,  1995:35;  see  also  Schwilk,  1995:465-468;  Schwilk  and 
Schacht,  1995: 16).  Still,  normalization-nationalists also reject the "ritual repeti-
tion of the word 'unique' in the context of discussions of nazi crimes"  (Maurer, 
1995: 73) and emphasize that German history must not be reduced to the Nazi 
period. Instead, they see a need for a "reconnection with the past" and a remem-
brance  of its  richness,  both  religiously  and  politically  (Schwilk  and  Schacht, 
1995: 16; StrauB, 1995:25). 
The call for a revival of Germans' "love for their own land" is  accompanied 
by a heavy dose of skepticism, if not outright opposition, to the kind of "West-
~e  term "normalization-nationalists" ("Normalisierungsnationalisten") was coined by  Peter Glotz,  the editor of 
the center-left periodical Frankforter Hefte.  Representatives of the "new right" have accepted the term as a  proper 
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ern" values that are now widely seen as forming the core of German political 
culture.  Normalization-nationalists argue that the German "Western orienta-
tion and integration with the West ("Westorientierung und Westbindung") are 
not well  grounded and debated as  rational decisions but are metaphysically 
transfigured  by  leftist  liberals  and  conservative  intellectuals"  (Zitelmann, 
WeiBmann,  and  Grossheim,  1993: 10;  see  also WeiBmann,  1993).  "Westbin-
dung"  is  viewed  as  having  "outlived  itself as  an  ideological  blinder  ("Ver-
satzstiick") which has  nurtured a  false  conscience in Germany"  (WeiBmann, 
1994). One of the reasons why  the normalization-nationalists see a  need to 
"demystifY"  Western  culture  lies  in  the  roots  of "Westernization"  after  the 
defeat of Nazi Germany. The reeducation campaign of the Western allies after 
1945 is  thought to have been aimed mainly  at erasing a  German  sense  of 
identity. "If one [that is, the allies of the anti-Hitler coalition] wanted to ban 
the German threat once and for all, the Germans would have to cooperate in 
achieving that  themselves;  they would have  to  lose  their historical identity, 
and, thus, their sense of belonging together and their self-respect. What was 
called for was  not the ability  to feel sorrow ("Fahigkeit zu trauern") but the 
inability to love ("Unrahgkeit zu lieben"): oneself, one's language, one's cul-
ture, one's customs, and one's history" (Rohl, 1995:94). For normalization-na-
tionalists there is little doubt that the allies succeeded since "Westernization" 
has  become part of a  permanent "education  program"  (Straub,  1993)  and 
since  German  intellectuals  have  thoroughly  "internalized  the  Morgenthau-
plan,  the  division  [of Germany],  and  the allied  education of the populace 
("alliierte Volkserziehung") as national masochism"  (Rohl,  1995:97, emphasis in 
original). What has been lost along the way is "that complex of melancholic, 
contemplative introversion and detachment from the world, which is  difficult 
to combine with the belief in progress and rationality of the West,"  a certain 
"pre-civilizational basic mood" which was typical of German culture in the past 
(Krause, 1995:136-137,140). 
How does this core objective of normalization-nationalists, that is, a revival of a 
distinct sense of German identity, translate into foreign policy recommendations? 
In comparison to the other four schools of  thought, the foreign policy program of 
the new democratic right is  the least developed. There is,  however, one distinct 
element that does inform current thinking and that may, in the future, form the 
basis for a  more detailed foreign policy agenda:  the rediscovery of geopolitics, 
including its German roots, in the writings of Karl Haushofer, the most promi-
nent German  representative  of geopolitics  in  the  1920s  and  1930s  (Hahn, 
1995:331-333; see also Brill,  1993,  1994; Weiser,  1994; Winkler,  1995).  (For  a 
critique of the geopolitical argument see Kandziora, 1994; Sprengel, 1994, 1995.) 
This "renaissance of geopolitics" is very much welcomed because it is thought to 
"provide important insights  into the interests  of states."  The German debate 
about geopolitics, however, ignores "the classical laws  of political action" accord-
ing to which"  all political ideas ... are geopolitical ideas" (WeiBmann, 1995 :31 9). 
It is not clear to what extent German foreign policy will need to be altered if 
"the laws  of geopolitics" are taken seriously by German decision makers. Nor-
malization-nationalists agree that Germany's geopolitical position condemns it 
to form alliances. Its dependence on the interests of its neighbors and on those 
powers  that have  a  transregional  radius  of operation  ("iiberregionaler 
Wirkungsradius")  is  higher than in the case of many other states.  First and 
foremost, therefore, geopolitical analysis will have to take into account the goals 
of other actors.  This fact is  especially  true with regard  to the United States 
because of the importance that Washington places on "the Mackinderian ques-
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within Europe is due to some extent to its good relations with the United States 
(Hahn,  1995:336-337;  see  also  Thies,  1993:527;  Inacker,  1995:369).  Thus, 
there seems to be agreement among normalization-nationalists about the im-
portance of good relations with the United States and the continued integration 
of the German army within NATO structures. Yet,  the integration of almost all 
German army units  into multinational units  and their assignment to  NATO 
command structures  is  criticized  as  giving  rise  to  "military  multiculturalism 
which  threatens  the core of the self-confidence of the armed forces  (,Streit-
krafte-BewuBtsein')" (Inacker, 1995:371-372). 
Opinions differ, however, as  to Germany's policy vis-a.-vis the future of Euro-
pean integration. Some normalization-nationalists are explicitly opposed to the 
downgrading of the European Union to a  free trade area, arguing that it has 
always  been "a classical  task of geopolitics  to  integrate  different zones with 
diverging interests" (Hahn, 1995:339). A majority, though, clearly side with the 
euroskeptics, arguing that the deepening of the European Union must give way 
to its widening because Germany's security depends primarily on stability on its 
eastern borders  (Thies,  1993:531). Therefore,  Germany should (1)  draw the 
appropriate lessons from the return of the nation-state and geopolitics (Zitel-
mann, WeiBmann, and Grossheim, 1993:13); (2)  work toward the stabilization 
of its immediate eastern neighborhood (preferably in concert with its western 
European partners) while granting Russia its own sphere of influence in the 
territory  of the former  Soviet  Union  (Hahn,  1995:343);  and  (3)  reject "the 
utopia of a total Western integration (Totalwestintegration') of Germany into a 
federal European state" (Zitelmann,  WeiBmann, and Grossheim,  1993:15; see 
also Watzal,  1993; M.  Brunner, 1995; Nolte,  1995:160), especially in the form 
of a  "French-led continental  block  with  an  anti-American  accent"  (Hahn, 
1995:339). 
Relative Status o/the Schools o/Thought 
Policy  Influence.  The five schools of thought discussed above represent distinct 
sets of opinions in the current German debate over the country's future foreign 
policy.  Obviously,  not all  of these views  are  equally  important or influential. 
Broadly speaking, the views of  the pragmatic multilateralists and the europeanists 
are the most widely shared by  the mainstream foreign policy establishment: the 
German foreign policy bureaucracy, the parties of the governing coalition (that is, 
the Christian Democratic Union or CDU, the Christian Social Union or CSU, and 
the Free  Democratic  Party  or FDP),  and an important segment of the Social 
Democratic Party (SPD).  (See Schossler, Albert, and Kostelnik,  1993:21-57, 141-
144; Biedenkopf, 1994:193-226, 1995; Riihe,  1994, 1995; Scharping, 1994:193-
226; Schauble,  1994:184-221; Kinkel,  1995a, 1995b.) Similarly, the views of the 
internationalists are shared by many members of  the opposition parties, including 
some Social Democrats (SPD) (especially the so-called left wing), the Greens, and 
the almost exclusively East German-based Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), 
which is  the successor of the communist party  that ruled the former German 
Democratic Republic. 
In contrast, the euroskeptics and, especially,  the normalization-nationalists so 
far have more limited (if growing) support within the rather small national-con-
servative circles of the CDU, the CSU, and the FDP.  However, one of the main 
messages of the euroskeptics-not to sacrifice the stability of the Deutsche Mark 
at the altar of a federal European Union-has begun to resonate even among the 
leading Social  Democrats. This may,  however,  primarlily reflect the SPD's per-
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party is  to have any chance against Helmut Kohl, the "chancellor of German and 
European unity," should he stand for reelection once again. 
Public  Opinion.  Even though pragmatic multilateralists, europeanists, and in-
ternationalists are the dominant schools among the foreign policy experts of the 
political parties, the euroskeptics can count on increasing (if somewhat diffuse) 
support among the broader public. Some of the key positions of euroskeptics are 
shared by a noticeable portion of  the German population. This especially includes 
beliefs  about what should undergird  a  European currency  and that Germany 
should put more emphasis on its own interests within the European Union than it 
usually has in the past (Asmus,  1995). Generally, however,  attitudes among the 
German population remain favorable toward European integration. Indeed, Ger-
mans perceive little threat to German identity as a  result of further integration; 
they  remain  aware  of the many  benefits  of the  European  Union,  rejecting  a 
hegemonic role for Germany within the EU; and they support the further devel-
opment of its institutions, including the transfer of German sovereignty to the 
Union, in such core areas as  foreign and security policies.  (For relevant public 
opinion data and interpretations, see Infratest Burke, 1992:3-4, 36, 58-67; Euro-
barometer,  1994:34-35; Noelle-Neumann,  1994,  1995:8-9; Platzer and Ruhland, 
1994; Deubner, 1995:33-39; and Rattinger and Kramer, 1995, especially Tables 
7-15.) 
Specifically, when asked the general question about whether they think contem-
porary Germany has a  right to play the  leading role in Europe, 43 percent of 
Germans in both the East and West object, while 31  percent are in favor and 26 
percent  are undecided  (Rattinger  and  Kramer,  1995:  Table  17).  If anything. 
Germans feel that their country ought to playa leading role in economic policy 
(81 percent in favor, with France mentioned by 6 percent). in monetary policy (77 
percent in favor,  with  France ranking second with  4  percent),  and in foreign 
policy (71  percent in favor,  followed by France with 58 percent and Britain with 
37  percent)  but not in  security  and defense  policy  (29  percent in favor,  with 
France ranking first with 37 percent) (Infratest Burke, 1992:47-49). 
The hesitation  to  play  a  leadership  role  becomes  even  clearer when  the 
public is  queried about Germany's future military role. To be sure, there are 
some indications of support for a  certain "normalization" in attitudes toward 
military  matters.  Almost  70  percent of Germans consider  it "normal"  for  a 
sovereign country to have its own army (including an astonishing 68 percent of 
the  electorate of the Greens),  and some  50  percent favor  having  a  "strong 
military"  even in the absence of a  military  threat to Germany  (Holst,  1995: 
Tables  1,  2).  Having  said  this,  however,  three  examples  from  recent public 
opinion surveys  show that the German population continues  to hold serious 
reservations about the role of the military in general and the use of force in 
particular. First. 64 percent of the Germans believe that defense expenditures 
are too high (30 percent about right; 5 percent too low) (Holst, 1995: Table 8). 
Second, 57 percent consider 370,000 troops (the figure agreed upon in negoti-
ating the Two-plus-Four treaty) as "about right," while 36 percent think it is  too 
high. and 7 percent believe it is too low (Holst. 1995: Table 9). Finally, there is a 
clear preference for "internationalist" goals.  Fully  92 percent of the Germans 
polled support the use of the military  in international  disaster relief or for 
safeguarding the environment. but support drops markedly when Germans are 
asked  about using  the  military  for  peacekeeping purposes  (76  percent). for 
fighting an aggressor in the context of the United Nations  (59  percent), or 
together with  the  allies  in  order  to  defend  German  interests  (54  percent) 
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In sum, while public opinion data indicate that far-reaching (and potentially 
costly) European integration projects such as  the European Monetary Union may 
face more difficulties within Germany than in the past, the same data also under-
line a continuing preference for multilateralism, including the readiness among 
Germans to transfer power to supranational levels of government in such crucial 
areas as foreign and security policy. 
Gennan Foreign Policy Alternatives 
What should one conclude from this analysis about the future course of German 
foreign policy? If foreign policy discourse does, indeed, foreshadow the major 
trends in a  country's policy toward the outside world-that is,  tell us "when a 
change is approaching, ...  what are the most feasible options, and what lines of 
action are precluded" (W::ever,  1994:255)-then the analysis of the five schools 
of thought can offer some insights into the directions German foreign policy 
might take in the future. 
Four Competing Options 
Basically,  there are four potential future directions for German foreign policy 
that are either suggested in the literature or debated in one form or another in 
public  discourse.  They  can  be summarized under  the  following  headings: 
"World  Power,"  "Wider West,"  "Carolingian  Europe,"  and  "Mitteleuropa.,,7 
These concepts may be said to represent the core competing grand strategies, 
"grand strategy" being broadly defined as  a country's overall "plan for making 
itself secure" (Walt,  1989:6; see also Posen, 1984:13).8 
World Power.  According to this option, contemporary Germany will choose to 
become a  genuine "world power" by going nuclear (Mearsheimer,  1990:35-39; 
Waltz,  1993:62-67, 1994:198-199) and/or by seizing "with both hands the United 
States' offer to be 'partners in leadership' ... enhancing its military power ... 
[and  becoming]  the  captain  of a  great  European  trading  bloc"  (Garton Ash, 
1994:78; see also Waltz, 1993:71-72). Germany would, thus, break with its current 
orientation of being both a low key military power and a player in world politics 
that acts almost exclusively within and through multilateral institutions. Instead, it 
would  assume  a  role  in  international  politics  similar  to  the  ones  ascribed  to 
traditional great powers by realists. 
Am'ong the five  schools of thought discussed above, there is not a single voice 
that advocates the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Germany. Even if this situ-
ation were to change in the course of a dramatic reversal in eastern Europe, it is 
7"Gesamteuropa." that is. the determined effort to build all-European structures that would increasingly supersede 
the dominance of  "Western"  institutions (and, most important, include Russia as a  full member with equal rights) may 
be considered a fifth option. However, even though there are many proponents for such an option among internation-
alists, it is widly considered to be unrealistic because neither Germany's Eastern neighbors nor its Western allies have 
an interest in replacing NATO with a collective security system. 
sAs with grand strategies in general, the four options discussed here do not cover the whole spectrum of  Germany's 
foreign policy.  More specifically, they are organized around territorial concepts that may obscure the fact that some 
schools of thought (such as the internationalists) advocate an overall foreign policy strategy that is organized around 
international and global policy issues  rather than territoriality. Still, as the previous analysis has shown, even internation-
alists assume that the existing patterns of world politics force  states to operate within largely  territorially defined 
confines.  Consequently, even the key  foreign policies advocated by  internationalists can be subsumed under these 
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very difficult to imagine a German government actively pursuing this option. Not 
only would it face legal hurdles (such as the stipulation against the acquisition of 
nuclear weapons reiterated in the Two-plus-Four treaty on German unification) 
and  the opposition of its  major allies  in the West,  but it would  also  have  to 
confront deep antinuclear sentiments among the German population, which are 
as pronounced now as  they were before unification (Infratest Burke,  1992:177-
186). 
The same holds for the two "milder" versions of "world power": (1)  the "part-
nership  in  leadership"  with  the United States,  and (2)  the "Moscow first,"  or 
so-called classical eastern option of German foreign policy (Garton Ash, 1994:77-
78; see also Waltz,  1993:75). According to the partnership in leadership scenario, 
Germany would strengthen its military capabilities and become the "captain" of 
the European Union in dealing with the other great powers. Although it is true 
that some voices  (among pragmatic multilateralists in particular) favor a  more 
visible role for Germany in international affairs and support the government's 
efforts to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, 
there is  agreement across the five schools of thought that Germany simply does 
not have the resources  and should not have the ambition to aim  either at a 
hegemonic leadership role within the European Union or a global leadership role 
in the traditional sense of a great power (Rode,  1991 :235-242; Kreile,  1993:52-
62; Schwarz,  1994b:75-78). Although some experts among the euroskeptics and 
normalization-nationalists argue that Germany should give priority to its relations 
with the United States over its  relations with its western  European neighbors 
(France and the United Kingdom in particular), none advocate that it should do 
so in order to play a  global great power role.  Instead, good relations with the 
United States are viewed as necessary to provide reassurance both to Germany 
with regard to Russia and to Germany's neighbors with regard to Germany. 
The "Moscow first"  policy  option finds  even less  support than the "America 
first."  Not a  single school of thought advocates this  policy.  However, there are 
important differences among the schools as  to how far Germany (and the West) 
should go in taking Russia's interests into account. Internationalists, for instance, 
oppose the expansion of  Western military structures to eastern Europe (at least as 
long as Russia objects or is visibly excluded), while euroskeptics put the inclusion 
of Germany's eastern neighbors in NATO and the European Union at the top of 
their agenda, even at the risk of Moscow's opposition. All the schools are united, 
however, in rejecting any kind of "special relationship" between Russia and Ger-
many "over the heads of the peoples between" (Garton Ash, 1994:77). 
Wu1er  West.  A second grand strategy entails working toward the gradual, possi-
bly parallel, and necessarily selective Eastern enlargement of the two key Western 
institutions, the European Union and NATO, as a medium-term objective. Ger-
many would remain fully  embedded within these institutions, thereby continuing 
an  established pattern that an  overwhelming majority  of experts believes  has 
proven successful for Germany in the past. In addition, the reach of these institu-
tions would be expanded, thereby gaining some protection from  the potential 
trouble spots on Germany's eastern borders. 
This option is clearly preferred by most schools and, not surprisingly, by gov-
ernment policymakers as well. To be sure, there are differences of opinion among 
the schools on how the strategy should be spelled out in detail. Among interna-
tionalists, for instance, this option would have to go hand in hand with a radical 
transformation of NATO from a military alliance to a system of collective security, 
which would have to include Russia eventually. Their position amounts to a radi-
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ists, on the other hand, a Wider West would be acceptable only if it allowed for a 
certain "de-Westernization" of German identity and foreign policy more in line 
with  the traditional precepts of realism.  These important differences notwith-
standing, there is agreement even among these two extremes in German foreign 
policy discourse that the key  challenge for Germany is  to come to better terms 
with its  eastern neighbors while staying on good terms with its neighbors to the 
west. 
Carolingian Europe.  According to this grand strategy, the organizing concept for 
German foreign policy should be continued concentration on creating an ever 
"deeper" political and economic union with all its willing neighbors in the Euro-
pean Union. As  things currendy stand, this "hard core" of the European Union 
would probably consist of Germany, France, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, and, 
possibly, Belgium and Austria, thereby encompassing almost all of the old Caro-
lingian  Empire  (Garton  Ash,  1994:74-75;  Seitz,  1994:847).  (For  Germany's 
"European" options, see Deubner, 1995:147-197.) This grand strategy would not 
aim at excluding other European Union members, but it would set more ambi-
tious goals for integration than are possible if all fifteen current members must 
reach consensus.  Moreover,  in adopting such a  strategy, the core states would 
push for  treaty  provisions  (or treaty interpretations)  that would  allow  them to 
proceed with integration even if the others were either not ready or not willing to 
go along. 
This option is favored by europeanists, some pragmatic multilateralists, and 
some influential voices within the current ruling coalition. Although the pursuit 
of a Carolingian Europe does not necessarily exclude the possibility of realizing 
the aims of a Wider West at the same time, even some of those favoring this 
option think that deepening European integration along these lines will  not 
only be difficult to achieve but may be counterproductive. Such "deepening" 
could, for example, have negative repercussions for the European Union inte-
gration project as  a  whole (Wessels,  1993:314-315). Euroskeptics, normaliza-
tion-nationalists,  and  even some internationalists  have  serious  (if diverging) 
reservations about various aspects of a Carolingian Europe. On the other hand, 
there are very influential voices in the German foreign policymaking commu-
nity who favor such a  scheme, including the present chancellor, Helmut Kohl, 
who considers the creation of an ever deeper European Union his "life's work." 
However,  given  that  the  most important partner for  realizing  this  option, 
France, is viewed as harboring doubts about its prospects, observers increasingly 
question whether it will ever materialize. 
Mille/europa.  According to this grand strategy, Germany would try to extend its 
influence eastward unilaterally, that is,  mostly without, and possibly even against, 
its Western allies (Brechtefeld, 1995:91-97). This option is based on the assump-
tion  that German interests increasingly conflict with  the interests of its  major 
Western partners, particularly France and Britain. As a result, Germany should try 
to create separate institutions with the states in central Europe. 
In comparison to Wider West and Carolingian Europe, the Mitteleuropa option 
is  considered quite unrealistic and highly undesirable by most observers.  Even 
though all five schools think that a congenial environment on Germany's eastern 
border should rank among the top priorities of  German foreign policy (if for very 
different reasons),  and while some euroskeptics  and normalization-nationalists 
may in the future increasingly sympathize with the Mitteleuropa option (either as 
a result of disillusionment with the lack of  responsiveness of the Western allies or, 
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Germany could "project stability" (to put it in benign terms) to the region in its 
immediate eastern neighborhood without securing the political and material sup-
port of its Western allies.  Moreover, even if Germany had the ambition and the 
means to do so,  and, in addition, the doors to the European Union and NATO 
had been closed to these eastern European states, it is  unlikely that the countries 
concerned would want to join institutions dominated by Germany. Finally, almost 
all observers agree that following this option would mark a major departure from 
Germany's traditional Western orientation (including a  dramatic unlearning of 
historical lessons) and would almost certainly lead to a deterioration in Germany's 
relations with the West. Adopting this option would immediately raise the specter 
of what has happened historically when Germany has attempted to playa special 
role between East and West. 
In Sum.  Table 1 indicates how the five  schools of thought in German foreign 
policy discourse relate to these four grand strategies. Although it is  more likely 
that Germany will opt for Mitteleuropa than for World Power, the most probable 
options are either a Carolingian Europe or a Wider West. To be sure, whether or 
not German foreign policy will follow one of these two paths (or some combina-
tion of the two)  depends as much on the intentions of German decision makers 
(and Germany's capabilities in the broadest sense) as  on the complementarity of 
German objectives with the goals of other important players. 
Germany as Ulysses,  Not Gulliver 
Shortly  before  the  Berlin Wall  came  down  in  November  1989,  the German 
correspondent for the Economist called on Germany's partners to "unite to bind 
the German Gulliver" (Carr,  1989:13). Subsequent events have shown that this 
metaphor was  inappropriate in  several  regards.  Not only  were  Germany's 
neighbors far from defining themselves as Europe's Lilliputians, but the image 
of Germany as a stranded giant, tied down by  a frightened people of dwarfish 
stature on a strange island, was a far cry from European realities. Germany may 
have been the Gulliver of Europe when the Nazis terrorized the continent and 
the world; it certainly is no longer today. 
Instead, the journey that began in late  1989 is  more like  Ulysses'  encounter 
with  the sirens.  Knowing full  well  that the reunification of the two  Germanys 
would take the country on a long and potentially dangerous trip by exposing it to 
the seemingly bewitching sounds of increased power and freedom of action, the 
German  government  (with  the  full  support of the  opposition  parties  and  an 
overwhelming majority of foreign policy  experts) set out to tighten the strings 
that had already tied the German Ulysses to "the European mast" (Keohane and 
Hoffmann,  1993:389). Disregarding all  the important differences between then 
and now,  even Bismarck may be said to have pursued a "Ulysses" foreign policy 
by  tying down the rising power at the center of Europe in an intricate web of 
alliances. Of  course, as the post-Bismarckian phase showed, the problem with the 
strategy of building a system of  alliances was that the loosely knit ties were too easy 
for Bismarck's successors to break as their ambitions for world power increased. 
In the minds of many German foreign  policymakers and experts today,  the 
basic problem for which Bismarck designed his system of alliances still has to be 
tackled:  how can the leadership make sure that the power at the center of the 
continent is  as  much at ease (or "satisfied") with itself and its neighborhood as its 
neighbors are? The crucial difference between Bismarck's solution and the two 
options favored by  an overwhelming majority of German foreign policy experts 
today is  that Bismarck was  content with the flexibility  and ad hoc nature of an -~-.~~--.-----
"Grand Strategy" 







World Power  Wider West  Carolingian Europe  Mitteleuropa 
accept increased global  best option but may necessitate  EU is important institution, but  not a  serious option because well 
responsibilities but deny possibility of  flexible adjustments in Western  Western Europe can be stable  beyond Gennan means; would 
traditional world power role;  institutions; must not undennine  without a federal Europe; deepening  damage Germany's crucial 
emphasize flexible multilateralism;  Western orientation of Germany;  EU may raise problems  relationship with the West; not 
reject nuclear status  expand NATO and EU pragmatically,  acceptable to  Eastern Europeans 
taking Russian concerns seriously 
focus primarily on Europe; reject  best option if it provides for  best option based on skepticism  worst option because would  deal a 
unilateral global role for Germany;  deepening of EU as  well; perceive  about parallel deepening and  fatal blow to EU; "gennanization" 
promote EU as global actor to  realize  deepening and widening may not be  widening of EU; best guarantee for  of Eastern Europe would provoke 
German interests; reject nuclear status  feasible at the same time; second-best  providing safe anchor (and  balancing behavior of other 
option if Carolingian Europe fails  international platform) for Germany  European powers (Russia, France, 
UK) 
concentrate on problems in  best option if  it addresses main  current level of integration is  not a prefered option but may 
Germany's neighborhood, especially.  problems in the East (secnrity,  sufficient; strong EU would  become necessary if situation in 
in the East; accept international  welfare); perceive German and  undermine Germany's ability to  East deteriorates and Western 
responsibilities commensurate with  Western European interests may  address problems in East, due to  partuers fail to address German 
Germany's limited power  conflict,  necessitating  significant  structural differences with France;  concerns about  providing  effective 
adjustments in Western institutions  could undermine NATO as key  stabilization in the East 
Western institution 
accept global responsibilities  best option if accompanied by  EU is important as  reassurance  worst option; "gennanization" of 
defined in terms of a global agenda  continuing demilitarization of Europe  against renationalization, but  Eastern Europe would likely be 
for common survival; reject any  (transcend NATO, strengthen OSCE):  Carolingian Europe could  lead to  accompanied by renationalization 
"militarization" of foreign policy  must not leave out Russia; keep  militarization if based on French  and militarization 
global agenda in mind  perspective 
concentrate on immediate task of  acceptable if it allows for rebuilding a  worst option because it would lead  probably not feasible, but may be 
rebuilding the "nation"; reject global  sense of German identity  to "Totalwestintegration": could  only option if situation in East 
ambition: do not openly advocate  ("Mittellage"); must not perpetuate  finally destroy whatever is left of  deteriorates and Western partuers 
nuclear status  "Westernization"; nation is  more  German identity  fail to address German concerns 
important than international  about  providing  effective 
institutions  stabilization in East 
TABLE 1  Positions of  the "Schools of  Thought" in Gennan Foreign Policy Discourse on the Potential "Grand Strategies" 
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alliance system based on the balance of power, whereas many German experts 
and policymakers today advocate either the creation of new international institu-
tions or the "deepening" and "widening" of existing multilateral and suprana-
tional ones. They do so not only with the full knowledge that such designs will 
deprive Germany of some of its freedom of maneuver but precisely because this 
effect is  actively  sought.  In a  nutshell,  then,  experts and policymakers  pursue 
"institutionalist" foreign policies even beyond the "mast" of the European Union 
in order to check whatever "realist" instincts may still be alive. In this sense they 
are indeed  saying goodbye  to  Bismarck-or as  Hans-Dietrich  Genscher 
(1995:1016), Germany's long-time foreign minister, put it in his recently publish-
ed memoirs: 
Germany's power has certainly increased since unification because the country has 
shed the limitations on its sovereignty and room for maneuver that accompanied 
the division of  Germany. Still, the increased responsibility for our foreign policy is 
not so much the result of  German unification as it is the consequence of  the changes 
in Europe and the world; the understanding of German foreign policy as  policy 
based on responsibility ("Verantwortungspolitik") rather than policy based on power 
("Machtpolitik") has  remained unaffected by unification. It is  only through the 
continued adherence to these basic principles that a European Germany can secure 
the kind of influence in the future that it had acquired in the years up to 1989. 
To be sure, Germany's journey has just started, and some observers may have 
discovered scattered evidence that certain segments of the German political elite 
are increasingly tempted to listen to the sirens of power.  However,  contrary to 
realist expectations, more than five years after unification there are few  signs (if 
any) in the German government's foreign policy or the foreign policy discourse of 
the country's elite that Germany will break with its traditional diplomatic strategy 
ofmultilateralism (see also Hellmann, 1995; Sauder, 1995). 
Comparing German and Non-German Perspectives 
How do these projections of future German foreign policy compare with the 
predictions  made in  the non-German  professional literature?  As  described 
above,  there are two  characteristics  that are shared by  almost all  schools in 
German foreign policy discourse irrespective of other differences.  First, from 
internationalists to euroskeptics, German experts agree that the concept of the 
trading state  (Rosecrance,  1986)  provides  the best description of Germany's 
current role in international  affairs  (Rode,  1991:242-245; Wolf,  1991:252, 
1995a,  1995b;  Rittberger,  1992:223-228;  Hacke,  1993:567-571;  Pfetsch, 
1993:213; Schwarz,  1994b:142-153; Senghaas,  1994). (For a  German critique 
see Statz, 1992.) Yet,  this concept seldom appears in non-German assessments 
of Germany's  new  international role.  Instead,  most non-German views  are 
shaped to a  significant extent by  realist concepts. Such thinking represents a 
minority perspective in the German discourse. For instance, pragmatic multilat-
eralists and internationalists consider territoriality or geopolitics as less impor-
tant than economic interdependence and Westernization (for example, Kaiser, 
1995; Wolf,  1995a). Yet,  many non-German observers have argued that geopo-
litical factors will exert more influence on Germany now than in the past and 
that German foreign policy behavior will  increasingly look like that of other 
great powers.  Thus,  around  the  time  of unification,  Stanley  Hoffmann 
(1990:604) predicted that in the future Bonn would opt for 'Just enough inte-
gration to meet the interests of German farmers, of German industry, and of 
the services  sector; just enough diplomatic coordination  to keep receiving a 
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vers to prevent unwanted restrictions as far as  foreign policy and defense are 
concerned." In subsequent years, other analysts have argued along similar lines 
(Bergner,  1993;  Smyser,  1993:27-37; Treverton,  1993;  Gordon,  1994, 
1995:101-108). 
Although many of these non-German analysts grant that Germany's "postmod-
ern conception of sovereignty" (Anderson and Goodman, 1993:62) will continue 
to influence its identity and foreign policy in significant ways  (Pond, 1992; Duf-
field,  1994; Le Gloannec, 1994; Livingston, 1994; Sperling, 1994; Young,  1994), 
they are generally more skeptical about the adequacy of the German self-image 
(Trautmann,  1991; Verheyen and Soe,  1993).  Not all would go as  far as  Gary 
Geipel (1993:19), who noted that "to take the German elite at its word is  to drown 
in the latest conventional wisdom." Yet, non-German area specialists would agree 
with Geipel's assessment that the German "either-or-mode of  analysis with respect 
to  Germany's  future,"  projecting Germany  as  either "a latent hegemon or a 
model of  international civility," is misplaced. Rather than aiming for a realization 
of former Foreign Minister Genscher's "seraphic vision of a  Germany diligently 
exercising  its  new found  responsibilities  in  pursuit of universal  brotherhood" 
(Marsh,  1995:167), many of these experts see Germany's continuing preference 
for multilateralism as a calculated and rational response, based on the assessment 
that the country can advance its interests more effectively  through such institu-
tions than it ever could on its own (Hamilton, 1991: 129). 
A second striking difference between German and non-German views of Ger-
many's new international role concerns the extent of its power. Even those Ger-
man analysts who sympathize with traditional realist concepts of power (such as 
the euroskeptics) do not believe that Germany's increase in power since reunifica-
tion  puts  it in the same league  as  the  United  States  or enables  it to  play  a 
hegemonic role in Europe. What is more, a clear majority of  German experts--es-
pecially  among pragmatic multilateralists,  europeanists, and internationalists-
are wary  of (if not outrightly opposed to)  traditional notions of power (Rode, 
1991; Rittberger,  1992; Kreile,  1993; Seitz,  1994; Kaiser,  1995). In contrast, an 
overwhelming number of non-German analysts still believe that such notions of 
power are relevant (Vernet, 1993: 107; Wallace, 1995). This is not to say that these 
observers are painting a  picture of a  remilitarizing great power at the center of 
Europe.  With  a  few  eccentric  exceptions  (e.g.,  Sana,  1990),  they  are not.  In 
contrast to German analysts,  though, they are emphasizing "that deutschmarks 
might go much further than panzers in extending German power"  (Markovits 
and Reich, 1993:272; see also Link, 1993c:190--191). 
The point of  contrasting German and non-German perspectives is not to judge 
which one is  closer to the truth. It is  simply to point out that such differences 
exist, and that these differences, if  they reflect perceptions held within the respec-
tive  governments, could have an impact on the policies  of both the German 
government and other states. 
Future Research 
Three suggestions for future research follow from the previous discussion. First, 
the  analysis  of the  five  schools  has  shown  that each  one reflects  a  specific 
combination of beliefs9  and assumptions about the viability and impact of cer-
"In discussing the nature of  ideas in foreign policy, Goldstein and Keohane (1993:8-11) distinguish between three 
types of beliefs: (I) "worldviews" which are conceptions ofpossihility, (2) "principled beliefs" consisting of nonnative 
ideas for specitying right and wrong, and (3)  "causal beliefs" which indicate beliefs about cause-effect relationships 
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tain  grand strategies for Germany from which concrete policy  recommenda-
tions emanate. The causal beliefs underlying the policy recommendations can 
and ought to be subjected to more systematic analysis. In the German case, for 
instance,  little  systematic  research  has been  carried  out on  any  of the four 
grand strategies (or related variants from the old Federal Republic of Germany) 
or the underlying causal arguments. As  a  result, support for Wider West and 
Carolingian Europe is based as much on assumptions about their plausibility as 
on  the rejection  of Mitteleuropa.  Paying  more  attention  to  the underlying 
c~usal arguments would help make foreign policy debate more systematic and 
ngorous. 
The study of grand strategy as  it has been systematized in the United States 
may be a useful point of reference in this regard. As Stephen Walt (1991:219) has 
argued, research since the early 1980s has revealed a "growing tendency" among 
scholars of u.S. grand strategy "to base their recommendations on testable em-
pirical and theoretical hypotheses."  (See  also  Lynn-Jones,  1991/92:56-57.) The 
same cannot be said about research in Germany and, perhaps, in Europe more 
broadly. Due to its different historical roots, international relations scholarship in 
Germany in the past has shunned the systematic study of grand strategy, a  ten-
dency that was probably reinforced by a broader public perception that such study 
belonged in the domain of historians. 
These shortcomings in German and European international relations schol-
arship are not meant to imply, however, that U.S. scholarship on grand strategy 
should serve  as  an unquestioned  model.  As  a  matter of fact,  based  on  our 
previous analysis  of German foreign  policy  discourse,  the U.S.  literature has 
some important shortcomings. Most important, it has characteristically used a 
rather  narrow,  military  conceptualization  of security.  As  Richard  Rosecrance 
and Arthur Stein (1993:4)  observe, the traditional notion of security  as  "the 
adaptation  of domestic and international  resources  to achieve security  for  a 
state ... in both peace and war" has been replaced in recent decades by a more 
restrictive understanding that relates the term mainly,  or even exclusively,  to 
military threats and/or military means to meet those threats. (For examples of 
this  narrow  definition  see  Mearsheimer,  1988: 17;  Art,  1991:6-7).  Paul  Ken-
nedy's (1991: 168) concurrent judgment that the"  essentially political nature" of 
the concept has been lost is particularly obvious in the case of contemporary 
Germany, in which the military playa secondary role in grand strategy at best. 
Moreover, as more recent constructivist critiques of traditional security studies 
suggest, grand strategies are not only the result of political conditions in the 
domestic and international environments but of broader cultural determinants 
as well. (For overviews and further references, see Kupchan, 1994; Wendt, 1995; 
Berger, forthcoming; Katzenstein, forthcoming.) Rather than taking the formu-
lation of interests as unproblematic, constructivists argue, it is crucial to exam-
ine the historical, ideational, and cultural sources of actors' identities in order 
to understand the behavior of states. All these efforts represent important steps 
in broadening the research agenda and refining our conceptual and theoretical 
tools  for  the  study  of country-specific  grand  strategies.  (See  also  Rosenau, 
1987.) 
This broadening of the research agenda must not leave out a rethinking of 
the theoretical foundations underlying the study of grand strategy, which is  a 
second area for future research. Obviously, one of the reasons for the narrowed 
scope of grand strategy is  the dominance of realism in international relations 
theory.  As  the above  analysis  of the five  German  schools  of thought shows, 
however,  there is  little support for the two  options that are suggested by this 
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role, nor is  it likely to pursue the kind of autonomy maximization strategies in 
its regional context (the Mitteleuropa strategy) suggested by neorealist theory.lO 
Instead, if we  assume  that the foreign  policy  discourse  analyzed here  does, 
indeed, foreshadow the general outlines of future German foreign  policy,  we 
are likely  to see Germany continue to adhere to the multilateral and integra-
tionist orientation of the old Federal Republic. 
One consequence of this  finding is  that we need to broaden the theoretical 
horizon in  the  analysis  of foreign  policy  strategies  beyond  the  narrow range 
considered currently among U.S.  security experts. Based on the logic of anarchy 
and self-help, realists see balancing and bandwagoning as  the main possibilities 
for states.  (For recent syntheses of the literature, see Walt,  1987; Jervis and Sny-
der,  1991;  Schweller,  1994.)  This  rather  narrow focus  has  only  been  slightly 
broadened recently by Joseph Grieco (1992:24) in an analysis of the sources of 
European Union monetary cooperation in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Start-
ing with the observation that the "renaissance of the EC" creates "serious prob-
lems  for  realist  theory,"  he suggests  that  a  distinct "realist-informed  'binding 
thesis'"  could account for most of the aspects of EU monetary cooperation that 
were difficult  to  explain in traditional realist  terms.  However,  even  this  realist 
"binding thesis" was thought "unable to explain why the German government has 
accepted EC institutionalization in the monetary area when its partners want it as 
a  way  of constraining German influence." To  account for German acceptance, 
Grieco suggested that "one might develop further the persuasive general argu-
ment already put forward by the domestic structuralists, namely, that a large part 
of the explanation for Germany's receptivity  to European institutionalized col-
laboration and binding must be located in that country's internal political and 
economic institutions" (p. 40). 
Whether German behavior is merely an exception to the rule (as Grieco seems 
to suggest) or whether it represents a distinct behavioral pattern that may also be 
found in other cases is  an empirical question. The German case, however,  is  a 
prominent reminder that the spectrum of  possible state strategies is broader than 
that suggested by recent studies based on realist concepts. In an article from the 
early 1970s, even Kenneth Waltz (1971) argued that "integration" (defined by him 
as the close association of  states in a cooperative spirit) ought to be considered as 
one of four "typical modes of behavior" open to states. States pursuing such a 
strategy would "try to promote closer integration through the establishment of 
durable institutions and reliable patterns of behavior"  (p.  465).  Conflict under 
integration, according to Waltz, means that bargaining replaces war-making and 
that "international politics begins to look like domestic politics" (p. 467). 
During the last two decades integration and cooperation have certainly ranked 
high on the research agenda of international relations scholars. Given the tacit 
general division oflabor between realists (military security) and liberals (political 
economy), though, little research has been carried out on integration as an overall 
state strategy (rather than as a systemic process) since the pioneering work of Karl 
Deutsch and his colleagues was published (Deutsch, et aI., 1957). It  is high time to 
redress these shortcomings. One way to start is  to pick up on earlier suggestions 
and develop an inclusive typology offoreign policy (or grand) strategies (Vasquez, 
1986:214-218;  Hellmann,  1995:121-127; Link,  forthcoming).  Such a  typology 
lOCiven that Germany's security environment has radically improved and that its relative power has increased as a 
result of the end of the Cold War and unification, neorealists such as Waltz (1993:62-70) expect that Gennany will 
increasingly opt for autonomy maximization. especially ifno external threat forces it to join with its Western European 
neighbors.  Autonomy  maximization  is  emphasized  by  all  neorealists  as  a  fundamental  motivation  shaping  state 
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would build on the theoretical and empirical research carried out by realists. But 
given  the weaknesses  identified  above,  it would  also  pay  special  attention  to 
strategies that have been neglected due to realist biases.  In a  second stage, the 
typology could serve as the basis for systematic, possibly comparative, theoretical 
and empirical studies, again with a special emphasis on strategies that have thus 
far been neglected.  Research along these lines would not only  help in closing 
existing theoretical gaps but could potentially contribute to "bridging the gap" 
between foreign policy practitioners and academics (George, 1993, 1994). 
A third area for future research revolves around discourse analysis, which may 
become an important tool for helping researchers identifY the possible ranges of 
both country-specific  and general foreign  policy  strategies.  In this  regard,  we 
noted at the outset that a very diverse group of international relations scholars 
agree (at least implicitly) that foreign policy discourse does matter. Besides con-
structivists, realists pay tribute to them. To be sure, there is a fundamental differ-
ence between  these  two  in that the former  emphasize how  ideational  sources 
shape discourse, whereas the latter argue that discourse merely reflects material 
factors  (such  as  particular balances of power)  (Mearsheimer,  1994/95:42). Still, 
insofar as they analyze the concrete foreign policies of states, both pay attention 
to discourse as  a relevant indicator of the directions in which a country might be 
heading (see,  for example, Waltz,  1993).  Given this appreciation of the impor-
tance of discourse, the question becomes whether and how the existing methodo-
logical instruments used in discourse analysis can be further refined. 
One point of reference and possible inspiration for such refinement is the litera-
ture on cognitive approaches to foreign policy decision making. Research on opera-
tional codes  (George,  1969,  1979), for instance, has established a  nexus between 
fundamental  belief systems  and individual behavior.  Figure  1  shows  the parallels 
between the causal mechanisms underlying the "operational code" approach and 
discourse analysis. The latter may benefit by incorporating some of the former. For 
instance, discourse analysis  could adapt, refine, and extend the sets of questions 
developed in the operational code to assess philosophical and instrumental beliefs 
(George, 1969). Empirical research has shown that these questions, indeed, address 
the most basic policy-relevant beliefs held by individuals. (For good recent surveys of 
the literature, see Tetlock and McGuire,  1986;  Rosati,  1995.)  Given its  focus  on 
intrasocietal collections of  discourses  (rather than focusing on individuals and discrete 
foreign  policy action  as  in the case of the operational code approach), discourse 
analysis  does, however,  face  a  challenge in adapting these methodological tools. 
First,  it has  to  establish a  theoretical link between the beliefs of individuals and 
collectivities. Second, it needs to develop a more operational concept of identity to 
OPERATIONAL CODE APPROACH: 
philosophical beliefs + instrumental beliefs -+ 
operational code -+ individual behavior -+ 
DISCOURSE ANALYSIS; 
beliefs (worldviews; principled beliefs; causal beliefs) + 
conception of  "identity" -+ 
discourse -+  foreign policy 
foreign policy 
FIG.  1  The Casual Structures of  the Operational Code Approach and Discourse Analysis GUNTIIER HEUMANN  31 
complement the tools already available to analyze beliefs. 
If discourse analysis were to develop along these lines, it could yield a system-
atic and multileveled picture of the cognitive and ideational sources underlying 
both specific policy recommendations and the preferences for particular grand 
strategies. Such a discourse analysis could have rich implications for international 
relations.  By  analyzing the ways  in which arguments are developed in a foreign 
policy debate, for instance, it would enable researchers to locate the sources of 
specific policy recommendations (for example, in particular worldviews or more 
immediate factors such as expediency), thereby allowing them to assess  the rela-
tive robustness of various policy recommendations. Moreover, in contrast to the 
study of grand strategy, which is primarily informed by the theoretical debates in 
the international relations  literature,  discourse analysis  would be closer to the 
"practical  theories"  actually  held by  influential voices  in  the  ongoing foreign 
policy debates. Finally, by  examining these "practical theories" systematically, we 
could provide  the broader public with  a  basis  for  critiquing available foreign 
policy options. 
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